Russia’s ongoing, comprehensive build-up in both its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces is made possible by sustained and prioritized investments in its nuclear weapons development and production infrastructure. The United States, by contrast, has forgone such benefits by upholding a “zero-yield” standard. Our understanding of nuclear weapon development leads us to believe Russia’s testing activities would help it to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities. The United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the “zero-yield” standard. Russia’s development of new warhead designs and overall stockpile management efforts have been enhanced by its approach to nuclear testing. In addition to the anticipated growth in non-strategic nuclear weapons, Russia claims to be developing new warhead designs for strategic systems, such as new high-yield and earth-penetrating warheads to attack hardened military targets like U.S., Allied, and Chinese command and control facilities. has determined Russia’s actions have strained other key pillars of arms control architecture, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The IC does not use the word compliance but rather characterizes actions as “inconsistent” with the intent of such treaties and uses those assessments to help inform the interagency process.įrom an interagency standpoint, the U.S. It is the job of the Intelligence Community (IC) to analyze those activities that have implications for a country’s international obligations. interagency policy community, I want to be clear about the role of the Intelligence Community. While compliance determinations such as the INF Treaty are ultimately made by the U.S. This is exemplified by the development of the 9M729 ground launched cruise missile.īy 2015, Russia had completed a comprehensive flight test program consisting of multiple tests of the 9M729 missile from both fixed and mobile launchers that appeared to be purposefully designed to disguise the true nature of their testing activity, as well as the true capacity of the missile. Where limits or reductions have existed, such as with the INF Treaty or the 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the United States assesses that Russia has not fulfilled them. Most Russian systems lack externally distinguishing features that would allow observers to differentiate between conventional and nuclear variants. We assess Russia possesses up to 2,000 such non-strategic nuclear warheads not covered by the New Start Treaty and because of a lack of Russian transparency we have uncertainty in our understanding of the scope and disposition of their stockpile.Īccurately accounting for these non-strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems is not only complicated by a lack of transparency but their dual-capable nature. Government determined violates the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF Treaty, as well as antiship and antisubmarine missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges.įor comparison, the United States currently has a single non-strategic nuclear weapons system: the B-61 gravity bomb. They include, but are not limited to: short- and close-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, including the 9M729 missile, which the U.S. We assess Russia to have dozens of these systems already deployed or in development. Russia’s stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons-already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role. These nuclear warheads include theater- and tactical-range systems that Russia relies on to deter and defeat NATO or China in a conflict. Russia is adding new military capabilities to its existing stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. This assessed growth is primarily driven by a significant projected increase in the number of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. We assess its overall nuclear stockpile is likely to grow significantly over the next decade. For the Defense Intelligence Agency this is why we exist, our core mission is to understand foreign military capabilities and provide decision advantage to our senior leadership.Īfter working together for decades to achieve real nuclear reductions, Russia is upgrading the capacity of its nuclear forces. With the return of great power competition, nuclear capabilities are again at the forefront of critical work for the Intelligence Community. Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trendsįirst, let me thank the Hudson Institute for hosting this event and the opportunity to speak about Russian and Chinese nuclear modernization trends.
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